Recital 80
Digital Operational Resilience Act · UE 2022/2554
| (80) | The Oversight Framework largely depends on the degree of collaboration between the Lead Overseer and the critical ICT third-party service provider delivering to financial entities services affecting the supply of financial services. Successful oversight is predicated, inter alia, upon the ability of the Lead Overseer to effectively conduct monitoring missions and inspections to assess the rules, controls and processes used by the critical ICT third-party service providers, as well as to assess the potential cumulative impact of their activities on financial stability and the integrity of the financial system. At the same time, it is crucial that critical ICT third-party service providers follow the Lead Overseer’s recommendations and address its concerns. Since a lack of cooperation by a critical ICT third-party service provider providing services that affect the supply of financial services, such as the refusal to grant access to its premises or to submit information, would ultimately deprive the Lead Overseer of its essential tools in appraising ICT third-party risk, and could adversely impact the financial stability and the integrity of the financial system, it is necessary to also provide for a commensurate sanctioning regime. |
In Luxembourg, the CSSF is the DORA competent authority for most financial entities (credit institutions, PFS, AIFMs, UCITS), while the CAA covers insurance. The law of 1 August 2024 implementing DORA explicitly designates the CSSF as the ESAs contact point for critical third-party providers established or operating in Luxembourg, and gives it the power to relay Lead Overseer periodic penalty payments.
Luxgap practice: for support PFS hosting data for regulated clients, anticipate the dual pressure from CSSF (PFS status) and DORA Lead Overseer by integrating both regimes into a single contractual cooperation matrix.